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Reciprocity plays a key role maintaining cooperation in society. However, little is known
about the neural process that underpins human reciprocity during social interactions.
Our neuroimaging study manipulated partner identity (computer, human) and strategy
(random, tit-for-tat) in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games and investigated the neural
correlate of reciprocal interaction with humans. Reciprocal cooperation with humans
but exploitation of computers by defection was associated with activation in the
left amygdala. Amygdala activation was also positively and negatively correlated with
a preference change for human partners following tit-for-tat and random strategies,
respectively. The correlated activation represented the intensity of positive feeling
toward reciprocal and negative feeling toward non-reciprocal partners, and so reflected
reciprocity in social interaction. Reciprocity in social interaction, however, might plausibly
be misinterpreted and so we also examined the neural coding of insight into the
reciprocity of partners. Those with and without insight revealed differential brain activation
across the reward-related circuitry (i.e., the right middle dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and
dorsal caudate) and theory of mind (ToM) regions [i.e., ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(VMPFC) and precuneus]. Among differential activations, activation in the precuneus,
which accompanied deactivation of the VMPFC, was specific to those without insight into
human partners who were engaged in a tit-for-tat strategy. This asymmetric (de)activation
might involve specific contributions of ToM regions to the human search for reciprocity.
Consequently, the intensity of emotion attached to human reciprocity was represented in
the amygdala, whereas insight into the reciprocity of others was reflected in activation
across the reward-related and ToM regions. This suggests the critical role of mentalizing,
which was not equated with reward expectation during social interactions.
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INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is a critical component of human social behavior.
Compared with other social animals, humans engage in coopera-
tive behaviors in a wide variety of social contexts (Hammerstein,
2003; Stevens and Hauser, 2004). In the prisoner’s dilemma (PD)
game, which has been used to examine cooperative behavior the-
oretically, the Nash equilibrium refers to mutual defection, which
results in a lower payoff for each player than does mutual coop-
eration and so poses a dilemma. The situation simulated by the
PD game can be replicated in society. Rational consideration is
expected to lead individual members of a group, society, and
international community to defect and result in a shortage of
public goods and damages collective well-being in the long run
(Olson, 1965). In reality, however, human cooperation is ubiq-
uitous. Reciprocity plays a key role maintaining cooperation in
society in which individuals expect to encounter others repeat-
edly (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Henrich et al., 2003). Indeed,
recent behavioral studies reported that humans are conditional
cooperators who discriminately cooperate with cooperators, but
not with non-cooperators (Wedekind and Milinski, 2000; Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr and Camerer, 2007). Reciprocity,
which is unique to human society (Clutton-Brock, 2009; Connor,
2010; Melis and Semmann, 2010), is intimately connected with
high social cognition (Brosnan et al., 2010) and is expected to
relate to the workings of the human brain (Fehr and Rockenbach,
2004; Yamasue et al., 2009). However, the brain activity that
underpins human reciprocity during social interaction has not
been explored fully.
To explore the neural process behind human reciprocity, we
investigated the brain activation during repeated PD games in
which we manipulated the experimental conditions related to the
game [i.e., partner identity (computer or human) and strategy
(random or tit-for-tat)] in a 2 × 2 factorial design. Published
studies that manipulated the identity of partners have foundmore
activation of theory of mind (ToM; the ability to represent the
mental states of self and others) regions when games were played
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against humans than against computers and reported different
implications of the reward circuitry between playing with humans
and computers (McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2002, 2004;
Krach et al., 2008). However, the differential activation might
not necessarily have been attributable ultimately to partner iden-
tity: differential activation might also be linked with differences
in observed and expected behaviors of partners with distinct
identities. To differentiate their effects on brain activation, we
therefore manipulated both the identity and strategy of partners.
Recent experiments that focused on the effect of partner strate-
gies explored differential activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC) when playing with human agents who were
cooperative, neutral, and non-cooperative (Suzuki et al., 2011)
and found activation in the superior temporal sulcus as a func-
tion of successful adaption to reciprocal/non-reciprocal strategies
of computer agents (Haruno and Kawato, 2009). In distinction,
we focused on a neural process that would be associated specif-
ically with reciprocity from humans (i.e., not with computers)
and cross-examined the neural processes while controlling both
identity and strategy.
Whereas neuroimaging studies using games originally focused
on reward-related regions [the caudate nucleus, the orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC), the anterior and posterior cingulate cortex, and the
DLPFC] (Lee, 2008), an increasing number of studies (McCabe
et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2002, 2008a; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2004;
Lee, 2006; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011) have reported activation of
brain regions implicated in ToM, including the temporal pari-
etal junction and the precuneus (Carrington and Bailey, 2009;
Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). The ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (VMPFC) and the amygdala have been often implicated
in both ToM and reward processing (Lee, 2006; Beckmann et al.,
2009; Roy et al., 2012). The decision to cooperate/defect (CD)
requires one to make an inference from the behavior of others
in a variety of contexts and to revise and change one’s own behav-
ior based on the anticipated reactions of others and is expected
to accompany activations in ToM regions. Going beyond func-
tional localization, experimental games have recently reported
the representation of subjective values relating to inference of
other’s behaviors and insight into opponent’s strategies in ToM
region (Hampton et al., 2008; Bhatt et al., 2010; Carter et al.,
2012). Whereas these published experiments used games that had
no possibility of cooperation, we used repeated PD games that
involved the possibility of cooperation and thus reciprocity. This
enabled us to explore the neural representation of insight into
reciprocity of partner strategy and subjective values attached to
reciprocal and non-reciprocal partners.
The neural processes underlying reciprocity in social inter-
action should involve both emotion and social cognition (van
den Bos et al., 2009; Strobel et al., 2011). We hypothesized
that the presence and absence of reciprocity in social interac-
tion with humans involved different emotional states, which are
represented by subjective values, i.e., preferences for partners,
in the amygdala. The presence and absence of reciprocity, how-
ever, may be plausibly misinterpreted, particularly when infer-
ence and insight into the intent of others is required for such
an interpretation. We hypothesized that those with and with-
out insight into reciprocity would reveal differential activation
across reward-related and ToM regions and that the differential
activation was not a mere reflection of reward expectation.
Specifically, insight into human reciprocity has great conse-
quences for our social life. Therefore, we also hypothesized that
the neural activity specific to inferring reciprocity from humans
would involve regions that have been linked to mentalizing, such
as the VMPFC and precuneus.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
In total, 26 healthy volunteers (14 females, 12 males; mean
age ± SD, 20.5 ± 2.1) recruited from university campuses were
screened to exclude those inappropriate for magnetic resonance
(MR) scanning. All participants were neurologically normal and
strongly right-handed according to the Edinburgh Inventory
(Oldfield, 1971). Participants completed all four sessions and
complied with the movement restrictions during functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) sessions. Prior to scanning,
participants finished a computer tutorial, and we confirmed
that they fully understood the procedure. All subjects provided
written informed consent for the study. This study complied
with the Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association
(Declaration of Helsinki) and was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the National Rehabilitation Center for Persons with
Disabilities.
PROCEDURE AND DESIGN
One female and one male researcher conducted all experiments
together to control for the putative influence of gender of the
experimenter on the playing behavior of participants (Skotko
et al., 1974).
Experiments followed a factorial design with two factors and
two levels: a partner’s putative identity (computer vs. human)
and a partner’s controlled strategy (random vs. tit-for-tat).
Four sessions were conducted, and data were collected under
four contextual conditions (Figure 1): computer-random (CR),
computer-tit-for-tat (CT), human-random (HR), and human-
tit-for-tat (HT). Participants engaged in each of the four sessions
in random order. Each session ended after 20–23 rounds (ran-
domly assigned) of PD games, and participants were told that
each session could terminate at any point before 30 rounds were
played. Each session continued for approximately 15–20min,
with a break of 3–5min between sessions. Partners’ responses
were generated by a computer algorithm. A random strategy was
programmed to involve cooperation (defection) with a probabil-
ity of 0.5 in each round. A tit-for-tat strategy was programmed
to start with cooperation and then repeat the response given
by the subject in the previous round (Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981).
Participants were told that their final reward would be pro-
portional to the total sum of their payoffs from the games.
Participants were informed about the partner’s identity (i.e., com-
puter or human), but not informed about the partner’s strategy
(i.e., the way in which a partner was programmed to play).
Participants were photographed and explained that their pictures
were shown to the same-sex human partner, whereas they were
shown the partner’s picture: the partner was allegedly playing
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FIGURE 1 | Time course of the fMRI experiment. (A) After their partner
was introduced, the subjects played 20–23 rounds of the prisoner’s dilemma
game, and both players’ scores for the session were displayed on a screen
for 8 s at the end of each of four sessions (CR/CT/HR/HT). Before and after
the games with humans, the subjects viewed a picture of a same-sex partner
displayed on the screen for 6 s and rated their preference on a thermometric
scale for her/him for 15 s. The same picture was shown in both human
(HR/HT) sessions. (B) During each round, the subjects viewed a payoff matrix
for 4 s, pressed a key for 2 s, and viewed the outcome for 4 s. The cell of the
payoff matrix chosen in the round was highlighted. Imaging analysis was
focused on the outcome stage. The stages were separated by an 8-s display
of a fixation cross.
in another room and was not introduced in person. Using a
post-scanning questionnaire, we asked the subjects whether they
had noticed any inconsistencies or differences between the actual
playing of the game and the explanation prior to the experi-
ments. All of them answered that they were playing, as had been
explained, two sessions with humans and the computer, respec-
tively; they believed that they were playing with actual humans in
human sessions.
fMRI PARADIGM
At the beginning of all sessions, the subjects were informed about
the identity of their partner, and this introductory stage was the
same in both the computer and human sessions (see Figure 1A
for details). Before and after playing games in each of the human
(HR/HT) sessions, the subjects viewed a picture of a same-sex
human partner and scaled their preferences using a thermometric
scale (explained in detail in Behavioral Data). The same picture
was shown in both human sessions. During a round of PD games
in each of four sessions (Figure 1B), subjects chose to cooper-
ate (C) or defect (D). Four outcomes were shown in the form
of a payoff matrix: cooperate/cooperate (CC), cooperate/defect
(CD), defect/cooperate (DC), and defect/defect (DD), where the
first letter represents the response of participants and the second
represents the response of partners. The cell of the payoff matrix
chosen in the round was highlighted.
BEHAVIORAL DATA
We used two behavioral indicators for behavioral and neu-
ral analyses: changes in preference for human partners and
insight into reciprocity of partner strategy. Changes in prefer-
ence were aimed to quantify the participant’s affection toward
partners that was changed by playing games. Before and after
each human (HR/HT) session, the subjects were asked to indi-
cate their preferences. Preference was rated on a thermometric
scale, on which 0◦ means “least favorable,” 100◦ means “most
favorable,” and 50◦ means “neutral” (Figure 1A). The thermo-
metric scale has been widely used to measure voter preferences
for candidates in elections (Weisberg and Miller, 1979; Cairns
et al., 2006), and was used in a published fMRI study (Kato
et al., 2009). We subtracted the pre-session from the post-session
rating and calculated changes in preferences. Changes in prefer-
ences were used to calculate correlations with other behavioral
indicators, including the player’s cooperation/defection rates and
session scores (represented by the average payoff per round in
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each session). We also calculated their correlations with brain
activation, as explained in more detail in Neural Activity and
Behavior.
Insight into reciprocity of partner strategy was a behavioral
indicator by which subjects in each session were split into two.We
divided the participants into two groups according to their answer
to a simple question that was focused on a critical difference
between the two strategies; i.e., the presence and absence of reci-
procity. After the fMRI sessions, participants who had been kept
uninformed about partner strategy completed a separate ques-
tionnaire for each session to determine whether they felt that their
partner had responded to their (the participants’) choices. The
insight group consisted of participants who answered “no” to this
question for the random (CR/HR) sessions and “yes” to this ques-
tion for the tit-for-tat (CT/HT) sessions. Those who answered in
the opposite directions were assigned to the no-insight group. For
behavioral analysis, this categorization was used as a dependent
variable in logistic regression analysis that had partner’s identity
and strategy as independent variables. We also used it as a factor
in a Three-Way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of imaging data, as
explained in more details in Imaging Analysis.
Behavioral and psychometric analyses were conducted using
the IBM SPSS Statistics (ver. 19) and Stata (ver. 11.1) software.
IMAGE ACQUISITION
The experiment was conducted in an MR scanner (Exelart,
Toshiba) at the research institute. The stimulus was presented
and synchronized with the MR scanner using Presentation
(Neurobehavioral Systems, San Francisco, CA, USA). During
sessions, gradient echo T2∗-weighted echo-planar images with
BOLD contrast were acquired at 1.5 T (TR/TE = 3000/40ms,
FA = 85◦, slice thickness/gap = 6/2mm, FOV = 25 × 25 cm2,
matrix size = 64 × 64, 18 slices). Each session consisted of 256
scans, the first three of which were discarded to allow for T1
equilibration effects. T1-weighted structural images were also
acquired after the four sessions were completed.
IMAGING ANALYSIS
Imaging data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM5
(Statistical Parametric Mapping 5; Wellcome Department of
Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, University College
London, UK). Realignment processing assured that the par-
ticipants moved their heads less than 2mm. The realigned
images were then normalized to aMontreal Neurological Institute
EPI template and smoothed with an 8-mm full-width-at-half-
maximum Gaussian kernel. A high-pass filter with a cut-off
period of 128 s was applied to remove low-frequency noise, and
an autoregressive (order one) model was used to correct for
short-range serial correlations.
We obtained individual-level contrast images during the out-
come stage (4 s; Figure 1B), in which subjects reviewed their
payoff vis-à-vis partners’, since we focused on the neural correlate
of reciprocity. A general linear model (GLM) was used to estimate
the parameters for each experimental condition (CC, CD, DC, or
DD) in four sessions (CR/CT/HR/HT). The GLM also included
six additional regressors of no interest to model head movement.
These regressors allowedmovement effects to be discounted when
looking for brain activation.
We used contrasts for each individual for the second-level anal-
ysis and estimated activation at group level. Data from 104 ses-
sions = 26 subjects × 4 contextual conditions (CR/CT/HR/HT)
were analyzed by factorial (between-subjects) ANOVA (Jackson,
2011). We performed two kinds of Three-Way ANOVA. The
first model included the three factors of partner’s identity, strat-
egy, and payoff outcome [identity (computer/human) × strat-
egy (random/tit-for-tat) × outcome (CC/CD/DC/DD)]. In the
first model, we aimed to examine outcome-related activation
that would vary with the identity and strategy of the partner.
The second ANOVA model combined the three factors of part-
ner’s identity, strategy, and insight into reciprocity in partner
strategy [identity (computer/human)× strategy (random/tit-for-
tat) × insight (insight/no-insight)]. The second model enabled
us to differentiate activation between those with and without
insight into strategy while controlling the identity and strat-
egy of partner. We applied a threshold of p < 0.05, corrected
for family-wise error (FWE), for multiple comparisons across
the whole brain to an activation map with the threshold of
an uncorrected p < 0.001, combined with a cluster-size thresh-
old of 10 voxels. Because the statistical power for detecting an
interacted activation is generally low (von Eye and Schuster,
1998), we identified the appropriate regions via a post-hoc con-
firmation of statistically significant activation using contrast
estimates.
We calculated contrast estimates using MarsBaR (ver. 0.43)
and analyzed inferences to examine their statistical significance
using IBM SPSS Statistics (ver. 19) and Stata (ver. 11.1). We used
rfxplot (revision 19) (Gläscher, 2009) to generate fitted responses.
Activated regions were anatomically labeled using WFU
PickAtlas (ver. 3.03, Wake Forest University School of Medicine)
and SPM Anatomy Toolbox (ver. 1.8, Institute of Neuroscience
and Medicine) and located visually using an anatomical atlas
(Naidich et al., 2009). All x, y, and z coordinates are reported in
MNI space.
NEURAL ACTIVITY AND BEHAVIOR
We used preference changes as behavioral indicators to exam-
ine the correlation with brain activation using contrast estimates.
We calculated the correlation between changes in self-rated pref-
erence for human partners during each session and the indi-
vidual activation in the amygdala that was associated with the
entire session; i.e., estimated without a separate regressor for
each round outcome. Activation patterns that were dissociated
between the insight and no-insight groups were also compared
for each session.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
Subjects cooperated more frequently in human and tit-for-tat
sessions than otherwise
During the game sessions, participants chose to cooperate in
an average of 58.5% of the rounds. Cooperation rates and
proportions of payoff outcomes in each session were averaged
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over 26 participants and are summarized in Supplementary
Table 1. A 2 × 2 (identity × strategy) ANOVA on coopera-
tion rates revealed a main effect of partner identity [F(1, 25) =
13.98, p < 0.01]. Cooperation with a human partner (64.4 ±
4.2%, mean ± SE of trials) was more frequent than that
with a computer partner (52.7 ± 4.8%). We also found a main
effect of strategy [F(1, 25) = 50.47, p < 0.001]. Cooperation in
tit-for-tat (CT/HT) sessions (74.1 ± 4.5%) was more likely
than in random (CR/HR) sessions (43.0 ± 3.5%). The interac-
tion between partner identity and strategy was not statistically
significant.
Those with insight were found more in human and tit-for-tat
sessions than otherwise
Table 1A shows the distributions of the insight and no-insight
groups in each session. The logistic regression analysis (see
Table 1B for details) showed that participants were more likely
to have insight into reciprocity of partner strategy (p < 0.05)
when playing with a human partner (i.e., HR/HT sessions) than
when playing with a computer partner (i.e., CR/CT sessions).
This analysis also revealed that participants tended to be more
insightful (p < 0.01) in tit-for-tat (CT/HT) sessions than in ran-
dom (CR/HR) sessions. The interaction between partner identity
and strategy was not statistically significant.
Insight into reciprocity increased cooperation and payoff only in
tit-for-tat sessions
Cooperation rates and proportions of payoff outcomes were sig-
nificantly different between the insight and no-insight groups
only in HT sessions. The cooperation rate in the no-insight
group (48.5 ± 12.9%) was significantly lower [t(24) = −3.32, p <
0.01] than that in the insight group (86.8 ± 5.1%). The rate
of mutual cooperation (CC) in the no-insight group (34.3 ±
13.7%) was significantly lower [t(24) = −3.04, p < 0.01] than
that in the insight group (80.6 ± 7.3%), whereas the rate
of mutual defection (DD) in the no-insight group (36.4 ±
13.1%) was significantly higher [t(24) = 3.47, p < 0.01] than
that in the insight group (6.0 ± 3.0%). In addition, session
scores of the insight and no-insight groups revealed no sig-
nificant differences across the four sessions [t(102) = −1.53,
p = 0.13] and involved no consistent difference when playing
against a distinct strategy: the session scores in the no-insight
group were higher [t(24) = 2.11, p < 0.05] than those in the
insight group in random sessions, but were significantly lower
[t(24) = −3.78, p < 0.001] than those in the insight group in
tit-for-tat sessions. This result was consistent with the expecta-
tion that those with insight were more cooperative and rewarded
more by playing games than those without insight only in tit-
for-tat sessions. This also indicates that the behavioral indi-
cator successfully distinguished those with insight from those
without.
Preferences were correlated with cooperation in tit-for-tat but with
payoff in random sessions
We also conducted correlation analyses on the relationship
between changes in preference for partners and other behav-
ioral indicators in human (HR/HT) sessions (see Table 1C for
details). Preference change was significantly correlated with
rate of cooperation/defection only in HT sessions: subject’s
cooperation rate (r = 0.429, p < 0.05) and partner’s defec-
tion rate (r = −0.436, p < 0.05). We also examined the cor-
relation between payoff outcome and preference change in
each session. In HR sessions, preference change was nega-
tively correlated with the rate of unilateral cooperation (CD;
r = −0.394, p < 0.05). In HT sessions, preference change was
positively correlated with the rate of mutual cooperation (CC;
r = 0.496, p < 0.05) but negatively correlated with that of uni-
lateral cooperation (CD; r = −0.532, p < 0.01) and unilateral
defection (DC; r = −0.545, p < 0.01). Additionally, a prefer-
ence change was significantly correlated with session scores
in HR sessions only: subject’s session score (r = 0.390, p <
0.05), partner’s session score (r = −0.398, p < 0.05), and relative
gain (subject’s session score/partner’s session score; r = 0.417,
p < 0.05).
Table 1 | Results of behavioral analyses.
A. Distribution of subjects with and without insight.
Session Insight No-insight Total
Computer-Random 5 21 26
Computer-TFT 15 11 26
Human-Random 12 14 26
Human-TFT 20 6 26
B. Logistic regression
(Dependent Variable: Insight = 1, No-insight = 0).
Variable Coef. SE Z
Identity (Computer = 0, Human = 1) 1.59 0.63 2.51*
Strategy (Random = 0, Tit-for-tat = 1) 1.75 0.64 2.74**
Identity × Strategy −0.70 0.88 −0.79
Constant −1.44 0.50 −2.88**
N = 104, Pseudo R2 = 0.133.
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
C. Correlations with changes in preferences.
HR session HT session
Subject’s Cooperation Rate −0.361 0.429*
Partner’s Defection Rate −0.018 −0.436*
Mutual Cooperation (CC) Rate −0.251 0.496*
Unilateral Cooperation (CD) Rate −0.394* −0.532**
Unilateral Defection (DC) Rate 0.374 −0.545**
Mutual Defection (DD) Rate 0.216 −0.263
Subject’s Session Score 0.390* 0.360
Partner’s Session Score −0.398* 0.366
Relative Gain 0.417* −0.244
Subjects with insight into their partner’s strategy were those who regarded that
their partners had not responded to their choices for the random (CR/HR) ses-
sions and that their partners had responded to their choices for the tit-for-tat
(CT/HT) sessions. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
www.frontiersin.org December 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 239 | 5
Sakaiya et al. Neural correlate of human reciprocity
IMAGING ANALYSIS
Mutual cooperation with humans but unilateral defection with the
computer was associated with activation in the amygdala
We found that outcome-related activation varied with the
identity of the partner in Three-Way ANOVA [identity (com-
puter/human) × strategy (random/tit-for-tat) × outcome
(CC/CD/DC/DD)], as represented in interaction effect (iden-
tity × outcome) (Supplementary Table 2). An interaction
effect was detected for a specific contrast (humanCC>DC >
computerCC>DC) in the amygdala [(−28, −4, −14) cluster-level
FWE corrected p < 0.05; k = 291] (Figure 2A). The amygdala
was associated with mutual cooperation with humans but uni-
lateral defection with the computer, which implied different psy-
chological processes linked to cooperation/defection with com-
puters/humans. A post-hoc examination of contrast estimates
also found an interaction effect (strategy × outcome), below a
threshold of multiple comparisons, in the right anterior DLPFC
(Supplementary Table 2; Supplementary Figure 1).
Positive and negative subjective values were represented in the
amygdala during reciprocal and non-reciprocal interactions
Individuals’ different activations in the left amygdala
(−28, −4, −14) in human (HR/HT) sessions were exam-
ined against subjective values, i.e., individual self-rated changes
in preferences for partners. The activation was significantly neg-
atively correlated with changes in preference in HR sessions (r =
−0.419, p < 0.05) and significantly positively correlated with
these changes in HT sessions (r = 0.414, p < 0.05) (Figure 2B).
We further examined the activation against other behavioral
indicators to determine whether the relationship between the
neural activity and preference changes was valid. Amygdala acti-
vation was significantly negatively correlated with relative gain
(subject’s session score/partner’s session score) in HR sessions
(r = −0.488, p < 0.05), but not HT sessions (r = −0.356, p =
0.075) (Figure 2C). The partial correlation between amygdala
activation and relative gain was not statistically significant (r =
−0.272, p = 0.189) in HR sessions when the effect of prefer-
ence change was controlled. Thus, the simple correlation between
amygdala activation and relative gain in HR sessions may be
spurious. The neural correlate of preference changes was not sig-
nificantly different when participants did and did not gain insight
into the reciprocity of partners (Figure 2B). In HR sessions, cor-
relations were negative in both the insight and no-insight groups
(N = 14, r = −0.349, p = 0.222 and N = 12, r = −0.350, p =
0.265, respectively). In HT sessions, correlations were positive
both in the insight and no-insight groups (N = 20, r = 0.438,
p = 0.053 and N = 6, r = 0.524, p = 0.286). These correlations
were statistically non-significant (p > 0.05), probably due to the
limited data, but indicated that the absence of insight did not
necessarily interfere with the relationship between amygdala acti-
vation and changes in preferences.
Those with and without insight into reciprocity revealed
differential activation across reward circuitry and ToM regions
A Three-Way ANOVA [identity (computer/human) × strat-
egy (random/tit-for-tat) × insight (insight/no-insight)] found
differential activation between those with and without insight
into strategy, while controlling the identity and strategy of partner
(see Table 2 for detailed results). Precuneus activation between
the insight and no-insight groups was varied with strategy, which
was represented in a significant interaction (strategy × insight)
effect [BA7; (−14, −72, 32), FWE-corrected p < 0.01]. Insight
into partner’s strategy (insight > no-insight) was associated with
significantly greater activity in the dorsal caudate [(6, 10, 16),
FWE-corrected p < 0.01], VMPFC [BA32/10; (−10, 32, −4),
FWE-corrected p < 0.05], and rightmiddle DLPFC [BA46/9; (44,
18, 26), FWE-corrected p < 0.05]. Significant activation observed
in the dorsal caudate and VMPFC was specific to the insight
group. In contrast, significant activation in the left DLPFC [BA46;
(−44, 30, 10), FWE corrected p < 0.05] was specific to the no-
insight group. In addition to these regions in the reward circuitry
and/or ToM regions, ANOVA revealed activation in the occip-
ital cortex (Supplementary Table 3). These results demonstrate
that both reward-related and ToM regions were linked to gaining
insight into the partner’s reciprocity during games.
Representation of insight in the DLPFC was not affected by reward
expectation
Activation linked to insight might simply reflect the implica-
tions of reward processing, rather than represent insight into
reciprocity in the DLPFC, which has been linked to general rea-
soning (Wood and Grafman, 2003; Van Overwalle, 2011), but also
is a part of the reward circuitry. To explore this possibility, we
examined whether differential activation was a function of pay-
off outcomes, which involved different material gains for subjects.
Across different payoff outcomes (CC/CD/DC/DD), activation in
the DLPFC was higher in the insight group than in the no-insight
group for random (CR and HR) sessions (Figure 3). Two-sample
t-tests of the contrast estimates for the right middle DLPFC
region along outcomes showed consistently different activation
patterns between the two groups in random sessions. No sig-
nificant difference (p > 0.05) in activation, regardless of payoff
outcomes, was found during tit-for-tat sessions or in the other
regions implicated in random sessions.
The presence and absence of insight into human reciprocity was
dissociated by precuneus activation and VMPFC deactivation
Activation in the precuneus was associated with those who did
not consider that partners were responding to their prior cooper-
ation/defection (insight group in random sessions and no-insight
group in tit-for-tat sessions). Figures 4A,B present the interac-
tion (strategy × insight) of precuneus activation and VMPFC
activation specific to the insight group, respectively, during the
human random and tit-for-tat (HR and HT) sessions. In the
HT session (Figure 4B) specifically, significant differential activa-
tion (p < 0.05) in two regions was reversely associated with the
presence and absence of insight. Examination of contrast esti-
mates of differential activation revealed a significant interaction
[(Insight/No-Insight) × (precuneus/VMPFC); F(1, 51) = 13.23,
p < 0.001]. The cross-over pattern of activation along the pres-
ence and absence of insight satisfies a statistical criteria for
“reversed association,” i.e., a “qualitative rather than quantita-
tive difference in brain activity” to “dissociate” regions (Henson,
2005, 2006), which has been reported in recent experiments on
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FIGURE 2 | Amygdala activation was positively and negatively
correlated with preference changes for human partners following
tit-for-tat and random strategies, respectively. (A) Amygdala activation
was linked to mutual cooperation with humans and to unilateral defection
from a computer [(−28, −4, −14), cluster-level FWE corrected p < 0.05].
Bar plots represent contrast estimates ± standard errors of the peak
coordinates for each of the outcomes. (B) Participants with higher
activation represented by contrast estimates at (−28, −4, −14)
[cluster-level FWE corrected p < 0.05] showed increased preference for a
partner following a tit-for-tat strategy (r = 0.414, p = 0.036), but decreased
preference for one following a random strategy (r = −0.419, p = 0.033);
∗p < 0.05. Each plot represents an individual participant. Those without
insight are indicated by hollow circles. The solid blue and red lines
represented the fitted regression line of all cases, i.e., those with and
without insight in HR and HT, respectively. (C) Individual activation in the
amygdala was negatively correlated with an individual’s relative gain
(subject’s session score/partner’s session score) against a human partner
following a random strategy (HR) (r = −0.488, p = 0.012), whereas no
statistically significant correlation was observed when playing with a
human following a tit-for-tat strategy (HT) (r = −0.356, p = 0.075). Note
that a partial correlation between activation of the amygdala and relative
gain was not statistically significant (r = −0.272, p = 0.189) in the HR
session when the effect of preference change was controlled. Dotted lines
represent correlations that were not statistically significant. ∗p < 0.05.
Table 2 | Results of Three-Way Factorial ANOVA (Identity × Strategy × Insight).
Region Brodmann’s area Mask MNI Coordinates k F (1, 311) t (311)
x y z
MAIN EFFECT OF INSIGHT
Dorsal Caudate 6 10 16** 571 32.04
VMPFC BA32/10 −10 32 −4 229 23.03
Right mid−DLPFC BA46/9 44 18 26 571 22.99
Left DLPFC BA46 −44 30 10 96 22.02
INTERACTION EFFECT OF STRATEGY × INSIGHT
Precuneus BA7 −14 −72 32** 776 28.01
INSIGHT > NO−INSIGHT
Dorsal Caudate Exclusive 6 10 16** 576++ 5.66
VMPFC BA32/10 Exclusive −10 32 −4* 318+ 4.80
Right mid−DLPFC BA46/9 Inclusive 44 18 26* 198 4.80
NO−INSIGHT > INSIGHT
Left DLPFC BA46 Exclusive −44 30 10* 126 4.69
**FWE corrected p < 0.01, *FWE corrected p < 0.05, ++cluster-level corrected p < 0.01, +cluster-level corrected p < 0.05.
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FIGURE 3 | Representation of insight into reciprocity of partner
strategy in the right middle DLPFC. Significant activation in the right
middle DLPFC [(44, 18, 26), FWE corrected p < 0.05] distinguished the
insight and no-insight groups when the partner’s identity (computer or
human) and payoff outcome were controlled. Bar plots represent mean
comparisons of activation in the right middle DLPFC between the insight
and no-insight groups for each payoff outcome. Error bars represent
standard errors. ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; ap = 0.066; bp = 0.067; n.s. = not
significant (two-tailed t-test). (A) Computer-random (CR) session. (B)
Human-random (HR) session.
social cognition (Raposo et al., 2011; Zaki et al., 2012; Izuma
and Adolphs, 2013). Furthermore, dissociated activation in the
precuneus in the no-insight group was accompanied by signifi-
cant deactivation of the VMPFC, which involved an asymmetric
pattern in fitted responses of (de)activation (Figure 4C).
For comparison, the neural activation pattern in the computer
sessionswas examined (SupplementaryFigure 2).Activation in the
precuneus alongwith insightwas significantly different duringHT
sessions, but not inCT sessions, (Supplementary Figure 2B) and so
didnot satisfy the criteria for “reversed association.”Consequently,
significant (de)activation that was dissociated across two regions
was specific to those without insight into the reciprocity of human
partners engaging in a tit-for-tat strategy.
DISCUSSION
RECIPROCITY IN SOCIAL INTERACTION WAS REFLECTED IN
CORRELATED ACTIVATION IN THE AMYGDALA
Activation in the left amygdala was associated with mutual
cooperation (CC) with humans but unilateral defection (DC)
against computers (Figure 2A, Supplementary Table 2). Positive
feelings during reciprocal cooperation with humans, but negative
feelings during exploitation of computers, may involve intense
affective experiences, activating the amygdala in our experiment:
published experiments reported amygdala activation when trust
of and reciprocity with others was undermined (Rilling et al.,
2008b; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). The left amygdala, similar to
the activated region in our study, is associated with more intense
social stimuli (Kramer et al., 2007) and greater emotional inten-
sity (Phan et al., 2004), whereas the amygdala has generally been
linked with both moral (Moll et al., 2005) and social (Olsson and
Ochsner, 2008) cognition.
To further explore the possibility of representation of intense
subjective values in the amygdala, we examined individual
differential activations and found the opposite tendency in acti-
vations across sessions. Amygdala activation was positively and
negatively correlated with a preference change for human part-
ners following tit-for-tat and random strategies, respectively
(Figure 2B). This correlation was found across the insight and
no-insight groups and was thus not affected by insight into
reciprocity. Examination against behavioral data also demon-
strates that the correlated activation did not result from different
material gains during reciprocal and non-reciprocal interactions
(Figure 2C). Combined, these results indicate that positive feel-
ings during reciprocal interaction but negative feelings during
non-reciprocal interaction may be involved in a stronger (i.e.,
more intense) emotional experience than vice versa, which was
represented in the amygdala. Behavioral analysis further con-
firmed this interpretation. During reciprocal interaction with
human partners using a tit-for-tat strategy, mutual coopera-
tion contributed to increasing preference vis-à-vis both unilateral
cooperation and unilateral defection associated with decreased
preference. Changes in preferences toward non-reciprocal human
partners with a random strategy were influenced only by unilat-
eral cooperation among behavioral outcomes, which contributed
to decreasing preferences.
The amygdala has been linked to either positive or negative
emotion in some studies on social decisions (Adolphs, 2002; van’t
Wout and Sanfey, 2008; Haruno and Frith, 2010), but has also
been linked to both positive and negative social stimuli, including
rewards, in others (Costafreda et al., 2008). In contrast to pub-
lished works, the opposite tendency in activation in our results
conveys general implications for the role of the amygdala in rep-
resenting the intensity of affective values. In studies of non-social
affective values such as odor (Zald and Pardo, 1997; Anderson
et al., 2003) and taste (O’Doherty et al., 2001; Small et al., 2003),
the intensity of values was represented in the amygdala and dis-
sociated from valence that has been linked to the OFC. However,
representation of the intensity of affective values in the amygdala
has not yet been examined directly in studies on social decision,
in which experimenters may not be able to apply appropriate con-
trol over the correlations and confounding effects of intensity
and valence (i.e., higher intensity for negative than for positive
stimuli; higher intensity and greater valence for negative stim-
uli) (Anderson et al., 2003). Opposite associations of valence and
intensity across sessions; i.e., higher intensity for negative feelings
in non-reciprocal interaction but positive feelings in reciprocal
interaction, enabled our experiment to distinguish two dimen-
sions of affective values. The representation of intensity in the
amygdala, distinct from valence, in a study of social affective val-
ues was reported for the first time. The result also demonstrated
that correlated activation in the amygdala reflected the presence
and absence of reciprocity in social interaction.
INSIGHT INTO RECIPROCITY OF PARTNER STRATEGY WAS
REPRESENTED IN REWARD CIRCUITRY AND TOM REGIONS
Differential activation was found between those with and with-
out insight into reciprocity in partner strategy across other
reward-related and ToM regions than the amygdala. The right
and left DLPFC were associated with the presence and absence of
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FIGURE 4 | Differential activation in the precuneus and VMPFC
between those with and without insight into reciprocity of
human partners. (A) Human-random (HR) session. (B)
Human-tit-for-tat (HT) session. Insight into reciprocity interacted with
partner strategy in activation in the precuneus [(−14, −72, 32),
FWE corrected p < 0.01], but was associated specifically with
activation in the VMPFC [(−10, 32, −4), FWE-corrected p < 0.05].
The reverse association of activation with the presence and
absence of insight [(Insight/No-Insight) × (precuneus/VMPFC);
F(1, 51) = 13.23, p < 0.001] was observed for HT, but not HR
sessions. Bar plots represent mean comparisons of activation in the
precuneus and VMPFC between the insight and no-insight groups.
Error bars represent standard errors. ∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗p < 0.05;
+p = 0.051. (C) Asymmetric pattern of activation in the precuneus
and deactivation in the VMPFC was specific to the no-insight
group during HT sessions. Time-series plots (solid lines) indicate the
fitted response at the coordinates. Dotted lines represent standard
errors.
insight, respectively, while activation specific to insight was found
in both the VMPFC and dorsal caudate (Table 2). A recent study
reported that compliance with social norms during games acti-
vates regions in the VMPFC and the right middle DLPFC, both of
which were associated with insight into reciprocity in our study
(Baumgartner et al., 2011). The caudate nucleus has been impli-
cated in trial-and-error reinforcement learning (Delgado et al.,
2005), and the dorsal caudate has been associated with learn-
ing via positive and negative reinforcement and reward-seeking
(O’Doherty et al., 2004; Tricomi et al., 2004; Delgado et al., 2005;
Schonberg et al., 2007; Spitzer et al., 2007; Tricomi and Fiez,
2008). A region in the dorsal caudate that activated with the pres-
ence of insight in our study was implicated in a decision with
uncertainty about fairness of partners in iterated trust games (Rao
et al., 2013) and also with altruistic punishment of norm violation
that involved no overt benefits (Strobel et al., 2011). These results
have supported the possibility that activation across the reward
and ToM regions might be interpreted as reflecting the involve-
ment of subjective judgment of others rather than the expectation
of reward directly from playing games.
REPRESENTATION OF INSIGHT IN THE DLPFC WAS NOT INTERFERED
WITH BY REWARD EXPECTATION
Those with insight gained significantly more from playing games
than those without insight in tit-for-tat sessions, but not in
random sessions (see Behavioral Analysis); consequently, differ-
ential activations along insight might not have resulted from a
simple response to material gains. To examine whether activa-
tion is a mere reflection of reward-processing, we focused on
the DLPFC, which is part of the reward circuitry, but is also
linked to social cognition. A recent study (De Vico Fallani et al.,
2010) using the EEG hyper-scanning technique (Dumas et al.,
2011) has also reported activation in this region during recip-
rocal interaction in the iterated PD games. In our experiment,
those with insight were expected to internalize their partner’s
behavioral patterns, whereas those without insight more likely
continued to interpret information in an effort to understand
how their partners were responding. Previous reports on the right
and left DLPFC are consistent with this contrasting interpreta-
tion. More specifically, the right middle DLPFC, similar to the
activated region among those with insight, has been linked to
judgments about interpersonal relationships (Zink et al., 2008),
as well as to compliance with norms (Spitzer et al., 2007), whereas
the left DLPFC, again similar to the region associated with
those without insight, has been linked to integrating informa-
tion (Bunge et al., 2009) and to strategic sophistication (Yoshida
et al., 2010) and deception (Baumgartner et al., 2009) during
games.
We further examined activation in the right DLPFC as a func-
tion of payoff outcomes and found that insight representation
was not affected by reward expectation. Insight into reciprocity
was represented, irrespective of payoff outcomes, in activation in
random sessions (Figures 3A,B). As expected, we did not observe
significant differential activation in tit-for-tat sessions in which
the effect of insight was confounded with the one of reward.
Combined, our results imply that the neural representation of
insight is independent of reward expectation.
CONTRIBUTION OF TOM TO SEARCHING FOR HUMAN RECIPROCITY
Gaining insight into human reciprocity is critical for our social
life. We found the brain activity that was specific to the human
search for reciprocity in the VMPFC and precuneus. Although the
VMPFC was thought to be generally associated with social cog-
nition and mentalizing (Bush et al., 2000; Wood and Grafman,
2003), a region in the VMPFC that was activated among par-
ticipants with insight in our study has been linked to inferences
related to the intentions of others when playing games (Cooper
et al., 2010). The precuneus was activated when subjects did
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not find partners to be responsive to their prior choices (either
correctly or incorrectly, varied with the partner’s actual strate-
gies); i.e., among the insight group in random sessions and the
no-insight group in tit-for-tat sessions (Table 2). Those without
insight into reciprocity plausibly tried to discern the partner’s
behavioral patterns, which was consistent with the association
of the precuneus with high-level integration of social cognition
in general (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). Figures 4A,B contrast
the significant activation pattern in the precuneus and VMPFC
when human partners used random and tit-for-tat strategies,
respectively. The cross-over activation along insight between the
two regions in a human tit-for-tat session (Figure 4B) involved
a reversed association that represented a “qualitative” difference
in the brain activity and dissociated the regions along conditions
(i.e., the presence and absence of insight) (Henson, 2005, 2006).
Previous experiments have found activation in both the VMPFC
and precuneus during games in which participants thought that
they were playing with humans rather than with computers
(McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2004; Krach et al., 2008).
Distinct from this, our results indicated their further special-
ization in ToM. Indeed, the precuneus and VMPFC have been
functionally dissociated in recent literature on the default-mode
network (DMN) (Uddin et al., 2009), which is presumably acti-
vated during rest (Raichle et al., 2001) and overlaps with the ToM
region (Schilbach et al., 2008; Spreng et al., 2009). The precuneus
has been linked to attempts to understand the responsiveness of
others, whereas the VMPFC has been linked to reasoning on true
or false beliefs about reality (Sommer et al., 2007; van Buuren
et al., 2010).
Those without insight into human reciprocity revealed dis-
sociated activation, which involved asymmetric (de)activation in
the precuneus and the VMPFC (Figure 4C). Whereas those with-
out insight into a tit-for-tat strategy were less cooperative and
rewarded than those with insight across sessions (see Behavioral
Analysis), the significant (de)activation was observed among only
those without insight into the reciprocal response of humans,
but not of computers (Supplementary Figure 2). These results
specifically implicate the asymmetric (de)activation in search-
ing for human reciprocity. A recent study of a ToM-related task
(i.e., episodic memory retrieval) (Sestieri et al., 2011) dissociated
(de)activation of the precuneus and VMPFC, which were simi-
lar to activated regions in this study (Spreng and Grady, 2010).
Taken together, the asymmetric (de)activation of the precuneus
and VMPFC among those without insight into human reciprocity
suggests a contribution of ToM regions specific to inferring and
searching for human reciprocity.
In summary, the intensity of emotion during reciprocal and
non-reciprocal interaction with humans was represented in the
amygdala, whereas insight into the reciprocity of others was
reflected in activation across the reward-related and ToM regions.
These results indicate the critical role of mentalizing, which was
not equated with reward expectation during social interactions
that involved the possibility of cooperation.
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